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Abstract This paper introduces a special issue on logic and philosophy of religion in
this journal (Sophia). After discussing the role played by logic in the philosophy of
religion along with classical developments, we present the basic motivation for this
special issue accompanied by an exposition of its content.
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From a historical point of view, logic has been a constant companion of philosophical
reflections about religion. Arguments for and against the existence of God have been
proposed and subjected to logical analysis in different periods of the history of
philosophy. A good example of this are the several versions of the ontological argument
which appeared since Anselm’s seminal work, the Proslogion, in the eleventh century,
as well as the several kinds of logical scrutiny which they have been subjected to. Some
of the greatest pre-twentieth century philosophers, including Descartes, Leibniz, Spi-
noza, and Kant, have either proposed or analyzed ontological arguments.
Ontological arguments are of course just one type of theist arguments, albeit the best
exemplar of a priori arguments for the existence of God. Other (kinds of) arguments of
historical importance are cosmological arguments, moral arguments, teleological and
design arguments, arguments from miracles, etc.
From the perspective of atheist arguments, the problem of evil occupies a prominent
place. Names such as Epicurus, Aquinas, Leibniz, Hume, and Kant have addressed it.
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For instance, Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, from the eighteenth
century, remains one of the best pre-twentieth century expositions and analyses of the
problem of evil, even anticipating some of the tenets which would guide the contem-
porary debate on evil and God. Although many times put as an argument against the
existence of God, the problem of evil has been traditionally described as an inconsis-
tency, either logical or evidential, between the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient,
and wholly good being and the existence of evil and suffering in our world. Even
though in most cases equivalents, the latter way of presenting the problem illustrates the
real point of the problem, which is to challenge the rationality of theistic belief.
In fact, arguments for and against the existence of God are the most traditional way
to conduct the debate on the rationality of theistic belief, also called, as a field, the
epistemology of religion.1 The other great area of the philosophy of religion is the
analysis of the concept of God.2 There also, logic has had a role to play. Take perfect
being theology, for example. Basically, perfect being theology consists in, from some
definition of God as a maximally perfect being, logically deriving several of God’s
properties or perfections, including his existence—that is the ontological argument—,
uniqueness, omniscience, omnipotence, moral perfection, omnipresence, eternality,
impassibility, and simplicity. Anselm was the first one to do that; Descartes, Spinoza,
and Leibniz have engaged in the same kind of project. Leibniz was the first to not take
for granted that all perfections are compossible, bringing into scene the notion of
consistence. Nowadays, the consistency of divine properties, taken one by one or
collectively, is one of the main themes in this field of philosophy of religion.
All this does not mean that logic as a field had played a strong role in the philosophy
of religion. To start with, there is a distinction between the use of logic as an
indispensable component of any rational discourse and the use of tools and results of
the field we call logic. For instance, one thing is to propose an argument and even
analyze it (perhaps identifying premises and hidden presuppositions and conclusion and
seeing to what extent the former entails the latter) using plain language and intuitive
reasoning. Another thing is to do that with the help of a logical language and a formal
theory of inference or to make reference to pertinent results of modern logic.
This distinction becomes stronger when we consider the process of mathematization
which logic was subject to in the end of the nineteenth century and beginning of the
twentieth century. At the same time that this process was responsible for an extraordinary
growth in the field, it also produced divergent views concerning the role of logic in
philosophy. Referring to formalization in a broader sense, SvenHanssonwrites as follows:
Few issues in philosophical style and methodology are so controversial among
philosophers as formalization. Some philosophers consider texts that make use of
logical or mathematical notation as non-philosophical and not worth reading,
whereas others consider non-formal treatments as-at best-useful preparations for
the real work to be done in a formal language. (Hansson 2000, p. 162)
1 Pragmatic arguments such as Pascal’s wager, for example, also address the issue of the rationality of theism
but without trying to reach the conclusion about God’s existence.
2 We are here purposefully neglecting other fields of the philosophy of religion such as religion and science,
religion and ethics, Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion, comparative philosophy of religion, and so on and
so forth.
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As far as the analytic tradition is concerned, such a statement might certainly sound
odd; it is well known that modern logic played a role in the rising and consolidation of
analytic philosophy. For instance, the views of Russell and Carnap on the role of logic
and logical analysis in philosophy are still paradigmatic. While Russell famously
identified philosophy with logic—according to him, ‘Every philosophical problem,
when it is subjected to the necessary analysis and justification, is found either to be not
really philosophical at all, or else to be, in the sense in which we are using the word,
logical.’ (Russell 1914, p. 14)—, Carnap’s project of conceptual analysis had formal
logic as an indispensable element (Carnap 1950, p. 1–18).
This was naturally reflected in the work of many analytic philosophers of religion.
Alvin Plantinga, William Rowe, Richard Swinburne, and Peter Van Inwagen, just to
mention a few, all have in some way or another incorporated results and tools of logic in
their works. There have also been heavier uses, we might say, of logic in the philosophy
of religion which would fit better Hansson’s quotation; for example, there have been in
the past decades quite a good number of attempts to formalize, using specific logical
languages and inferential theories, several kinds of ontological arguments.3
Despite this, and contrasting with other areas of philosophy such as epistemology
and ethics, we can safely say that there is not a logical tradition in the philosophy of
religion. This is reflected by the absence of textbooks on the subject4 as well as by the
lack of mention of philosophy of religion in the recent work on formalization in
philosophy.5 Going through another path, there is not a close connection from the
professional academic point of view between logic and philosophy of religion; there
are no regular seminars or congresses or societies or specialized journals dedicated
to the topic.
Such a state of affairs is certainly regrettable, for if we take a very straightforward
characterization of logic and the two main areas of philosophy of religion we have
mentioned earlier, the exact opposite would be expected. From one side, logic is a
theory of inference. We therefore would expect it to have been massively used in the
construction and appraisal of arguments for and against the existence of God. From the
other side, logic is a theory of representation. We therefore would expect it to have been
used in the analysis of key religious concepts, such as the concept of God. By this we
do not mean that the connection of logic and philosophy of religion we are talking
about must necessarily go through formalization. Logic is a broad subject matter, and
its possible contributions to any philosophical field certainly go beyond the use of a
formal language and an inference theory.
A first exception to this occurred in 2015, when the 1st World Congress on Logic
and Religion took place in João Pessoa, Brazil. It was a forum where logicians,
philosophers, theologians, mathematicians, and computer scientists from all over the
3 Adams (1971), Barnes (1972), Oppenheimer and Zalta (1991), Klima (2000), and Sobel (2004) are examples
of this.
4 Sobel’s book (2004) could perhaps be one of the few exceptions to that, although he does not present the
work of a field, but mostly his own versions of several famous arguments in the philosophy of religion.
5 While Timothy Williamson (2017), for instance, mentions many paradigmatic instances of formalization in
ethics, epistemology, and philosophy of language, no word is said about philosophy or religion. This pattern is
repeated in the still small but growing literature on formalization in philosophy [see Hansson (2000), Van
Benthem (2006), Horsten and Douven (2008), Horsten and Pettigrew (2011), and Williamson (2017), for
example].
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world gathered to discuss the latest developments in logic and religion. Besides this
international and interdisciplinary flavor, the 1st World Congress on Logic and Reli-
gion was also interreligious: there were talks about all great religious traditions of the
world. 6 The approaches to logic were also varied, going from ‘heavy’ uses of
mathematical logic to more ‘diluted’ and analytical approaches.
This special issue contains some of the papers delivered at the 1st World Congress
on Logic and Religion. It is in fact the second publication resulting from the event. The
first one was the special issue on Logic and Religion of Logica Universalis (Beziau and
Silvestre, 2017), which focused on more technical contributions and tried to be
balanced regarding world religious traditions. Also, the styles of the contributions were
broad, not restrained by the philosophical approach to religion we are emphasizing
here, thus the title “Special Issue on Logic and Religion.” There were two papers
related to Hinduism and Indian philosophy (Bilimoria 2017; Silvestre, 2017a); one
dealing with logic in the Islamic world (Akrami 2017); and four dealing with the
ontological argument for the existence of God, focusing on Anselm’s Christian moti-
vated formulation (Archambaut 2017; Desclés 2017), Leibniz’s formulation (Lenzen
2017), and the contemporary formulation of Gödel (Benzmüller et al., 2017)
This Sophia special issue focuses on the connections between logic from a broader
perspective and philosophy of religion proper. The second and third articles are about
theist arguments. In the second paper, Jamie Watson (2017) shows how specialized and
localized argument analysis should or need to be. He deals with the kalām cosmological
argument or, more specifically, with a criticism against an argument for the second
premise of William Craig’s version of the kalām argument. According to this criticism,
the argument (not Craig’s argument, but the argument for its second premise) illicitly
assumes a finite starting point for a series of past temporal events, thereby begging the
question against opponents. One of Watson’s basic points is that there is an ambiguity
in the argument which the criticism rests on. Formulating a new, disambiguated
argument, which he does, is then a way out of the criticism. The reward in the case
which his new argument is sound is proportional to the specialized nature of the
enterprise he engages in: as he says at the end of the text, there would be in this case
one fewer reason to doubt the plausibility of the kalām argument’s conclusion (for we
would have found a reasonable support for at least one of its premises).
The third paper, by Cassiano Rodrigues (2017), deals with a theist argument by the
famous nineteenth century logician Charles Peirce. One of the peculiarities of this
argument is that it is not an argument for the existence of God, but for its reality.
Another peculiarity is that the argument relies on a specific non-reflective mental
activity which Peirce calls musement. He claims that in musement, we can achieve a
kind of perception of the intertwinement of the three universes of experience: feeling,
brute fact, and reason, therefore being in the sort of mental state required for us to
believe in the reality of God. Rodrigues’ main contribution rests on analyzing in
deepness the notion of musement and the role it plays not only in the argument itself,
but also in Peirce’s more general, metaphysical, and epistemological views. By ana-
lyzing the argument along with a more general philosophical framework, he follows a
different path from the overspecialized approach the previous paper instantiates.
6 See http://www.uni-log.org/logic-and-religion-1.html.
142 Silvestre R.S., Béziau J.-Y.
The next two articles deal with the prince of atheist arguments: the problem of evil.
More specifically, they deal with one of the central movements used by theists to
respond to the problem of God and evil: the project of theodicy. Thus, although dealing
indirectly with the argument, these papers are in fact contributions to the field of
conceptual analysis inside the philosophy of religion.
The fourth article, by Ondrej Beran (2017), discusses the approach to the problem
of evil employed of D. Z. Phillips. Phillips follows what many philosophers would call
a Wittgensteinian approach to the philosophy of religion. It is therefore not surprising
that his contribution to the problem of evil is strongly centered on the analysis of the
concepts involved. He criticizes the concepts of God’s omnipotence and wholly
goodness, and, perhaps more importantly, he lays down quite interesting arguments
against the idea that the evil and good we find in our world can be measured and
compared against each other, which is a key idea in many theodicies. Besides
presenting Phillips ideas on theodicy and the problem of evil, Beran points out some
important flaws in them. A very important one has to do with a key movement we find
in Phillips arguments: his use of what he calls ‘our religious language.’ Many times he
complains that the theodicist’s use of the notions of omnipotence and wholly goodness
does not fit into our religious language. But who is this ‘us’ on behalf of whom
Phillips speaks? He seems to uncritically assume the existence of something like a
worldly representative community of religious practitioners whose language does not
accord with some key uses of the terms made by theodicists. But this is extremely
artificial, to say the least.
In the fifth article, Ricardo Silvestre (2017) engages in conceptual analysis in a much
more explicit way. Following the basic lines of Rudolf Carnap’s project of conceptual
explanation, he proposes to analyze the very concept of theodicy. To Carnap, a
conceptual explanation is an attempt to transform a given more or less inexact concept,
the explicandum, into a more precise and exact one, the explicatum. Silvestre’s
explicandum is the concept of theodicy as used by analytic philosophers of religion;
he thus extensively quotes contemporary views on the notion of theodicy. From this, he
extracts, in a sense, several conditions which according to these philosophers a theodicy
should satisfy. Finally, he shows how from these conditions we can get several different
notions of theodicy, thus ending up with not only one explicatum but quite a great
variety of theodical notions. Although Silvestre follows what he terms a semi-formal
approach, in an important sense, his contribution belongs to what we have named
above as ‘formalization in philosophy.’
The next two articles move to the analysis of key theist concepts proper. The sixth
paper, by Errin Clark (2017), deals with one of the most important and at same time
most problematic divine properties: omnipotence. Roughly understood, omnipotence
means the power of doing anything. If, therefore, there is an omnipotent being, it is
necessary that he can do anything, like creating a stone that he cannot lift. But if this is
so, it is possible that there is something he cannot do, namely to lift the stone; he
therefore is not omnipotent. On the other hand, if it is possible that he cannot create
such a stone, then he is not omnipotent either. Consequently, the very notion of
omnipotence is incoherent, which leads us to the conclusion that there cannot a priori
exist any being which instantiates this property.
Naturally, such a conclusion depends on the meaning of the terms used. By saying
that omnipotence means the power of doing anything, we mean the power of
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performing any task or the power of realizing any state of affairs. And what exactly
does having the power to do either mean? Here, Clark tries to show that when we look
seriously at Thomas Aquinas’ views on logic, being, and power, these and other
pertinent questions are answered in such a way that there is no more contradiction in
the notion of an omnipotent being. For instance, considering either ‘a stone its maker
cannot lift’ (that is, choosing the power of performing any task) or ‘creating a stone its
maker cannot lift’ (that is, choosing the power of realizing any state of affairs), ‘its
maker’ is supposed to indicate God. Since for Thomas God’s essence contains all
powers and perfections from which the powers and perfections of created beings
originate as their source, there cannot be any perfections in a created being that do
not already exist (preeminently) in God. Therefore, neither statement can succeed in
indicating anything possibly real.
In the seventh paper, Daniel Molto (2017) presents an instantiation of the relations
that might be between philosophical theology and formal logic. He deals with the use
of formal logic in the clarification of religious concepts, in this case the Christian
concept of Trinity. More than a clarification, however, the paper deals with the attempt
to solve a contradiction involved in this concept. The doctrine of Trinity, as it is many
times called, involves the idea that God exists in three persons. In order to have content,
these three persons of the Trinity must be somehow different from each other; but then,
we have not one God, but three Gods. But according to one of the most basic
assumptions of Christianity, God is one; therefore, if God exists in three persons, they
must be identical to each other. We thus have a contradiction.
This conclusion depends on the way we see the relation of identity: it basically
assumes an interpretation of the expression ‘there is but one God’ alike to Russell’s
theory of definitive descriptions: for some y, y is God, and for any z, if z is God, z is
the same as y. According to Peter Geach, however, that was not the way Aquinas
saw it: According to him, the sameness involved here must be specified by some
general term signifying a form of nature. Therefore, the correct way to represent the
expression would be as follows: for some y, y is God, and for any z, if z is God, z is
the same God as y, which would block the conclusion that the three persons of the
trinity are identical (in all respects) to each other. Taking up this idea, Molto defends
that the so-called strong theory of relative identity is the best solution to the
problem of Trinity. Besides, presenting thus the problem, he elaborates what he
takes to be the most pressing objection to this account of the Trinity, namely that it
cannot be supplemented with a coherent model-theoretic semantics, coming up with
a proposed solution to it.
These are the papers related to the 1st World Congress on Logic and Religion.
Besides them, this issue contains seven more original papers not connected with the
aforementioned event but still related to the main theme of the issue—God’s Existence
and the Kantian Formula of Humanity by John Lemos; A Radical Solution to the
Problem of Evil by Gerald K. Harrison; Free Will Theodicies for Theological Deter-
minists by T. Ryan Byerly; Kant on the Epistemology of Indirect Mystical Experience
by Ayon Maharaj; Imagine Being a Preta: Early Indian Yogācāra Approaches to
Intersubjectivity by Roy Tzohar; An Introduction to the Daśaślokī of Śaṃkara and
Its Commentary Siddhāntabindu by Madhusūdana Sarasvatī by Niranjan Saha; and
Skeptical Theism Remains Refuted: a Reply to Perrine by David Kyle Johnson—two
book reviews and an obituary.
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